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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider the problem of constructing secret sharing schemes without the 
assistance of a Dealer. We show how to implement Brickell’s Vector space construction as 
a democratic secret sharing scheme. As a special case, we construct democratic threshold 
schemes by using Sharmir’s method. In our democratic secret sharing schemes, the participants 
need no more information to be kept secret (shares) than they would need in the case where the 
schemes are constructed by a Dealer. 
1. Introduction 
Letp={P,,... , P,,} be a finite set of n participants and r be a set of subsets of c?. 
A secret sharing scheme is a method to distribute partial information or shares to the 
participants in 9 in such a way that 
l any set of participants A E r can determine a secret s, 
l no subset of participants A’$T can do so. 
The set r is called the access structure and the subsets in r are called authorized 
subsets. A secret sharing scheme is said to be “Perfect” if no subset of participants 
A’$T can determine any partial information regarding the secret s (in an information 
theoretic sense) even with infinite computational resources. Blakley [3] and Shamir 
[ 151 introduced independently perfect (k, n) threshold secret sharing schemes in 1979. 
A perfect (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme realizes a special access structure such 
that: 
l any k participants can determine the secret s, 
l no subset of k - 1 participants or less can determine any partial information 
regarding s. 
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Secret sharing schemes have received considerable attention in the last few years 
because of their many applications to several fields, such as data security, secure 
computation and others [ 111. For an extensive bibliography and illustration of the 
main results in the area, the reader is referred to [l&19]. 
In secret sharing classical iterature, all schemes depend, in their realization, on the 
existence of a Dealer whose function is, first, to choose the secret s and, then, to 
determine and distribute the shares to the participants in 8. Recently, various 
researchers have considered the possibility that the Dealer may attempt to cheat, 
distributing an inconsistent set of shares, so that the secret cannot be determined 
correctly or so that different subsets of participants in r would calculate different 
secrets from the shares they possess. Some papers that addressed the problem are 
~1~2~71. 
For many applications, no one can be trusted to know the secret. Therefore, 
Ingemarsson and Simmons [12] considered the problem of constructing secret shar- 
ing schemes without the assistance of a Dealer. For example, “Unanimous consent 
secret sharing scheme” [12] realizes an access structure r where the only subset of 
participants that can determine the secret s is the set of all the participants in 8. To 
implement a perfect unanimous consent secret sharing scheme, each of the partici- 
pants in 9 could choose his share to be a random element of a finite field GF(q) with 
q elements, where q is a prime power (throughout the paper we refer such a field by 
GF(q)). The sum over GF(q) of the shares of the participants in S could be taken as 
the secret s of the scheme. Unanimous consent secret sharing schemes are well known 
schemes in literature [13,19] and they have been used for several years to ensure 
unanimous consent before a controlled action can be initiated [17]. Unfortunately, 
unanimous consent secret sharing schemes are the only known example of schemes 
that can be implemented in such a way that the participants can define the secret s by 
a random choice of their shares. However, Ingemarsson and Simmons gave a protocol 
to construct secret sharing schemes realizing any access structures without the 
assistance of a Dealer. Briefly, in Ingemarsson and Simmons’ protocol, the partici- 
pants first construct a unanimous consent secret sharing scheme and then they share 
the random information chosen among other participants by using private secret 
sharing schemes. Ingemarsson and Simmons referred their schemes as “Democratic 
secret sharing schemes”. Democratic secret sharing only permits the sharing of 
a “random” secret among the participants, whereas in a traditional secret sharing 
scheme the Dealer can share any secret he desires. 
An important issue in the implementation of secret sharing schemes is the size of 
shares distributed to participants since the security of a system degrades as the 
amount of the information that must be kept secret increases. Recently, several papers 
studied this topic and both upper bounds and lower bounds on the size of the shares 
have been provided [4,5,8-10,201. In Ingemarsson and Simmons’ proposals to 
implement democratic secret sharing schemes, the participants keep secret all the 
private information distributed by other participants. Consequently, so far, the main 
disadvantage of democratic secret sharing schemes, with respect to the schemes 
M. Carpentieri / Discrete Applied Mathematics 59 (1995) 293-298 295 
constructed by a Dealer, appeared to be the size of shares distributed to participants. 
In this paper, we show how to implement the Vector space construction due to 
Brickell [6] as a democratic secret sharing scheme. As a special case, we construct 
(k, n) threshold democratic schemes by using Shamir’s method [15]. In our democratic 
secret sharing schemes the participants need no more information to be kept secret 
(shares) than they would need in the case where the schemes are constructed by 
a Dealer. 
2. The vector space democratic construction 
Let r # {9} be the access tructure that the participants in 9 would like to realize 
and GF(q)’ be the t-dimensional vector space over GF(q), where t > 2. Suppose there 
exists a function, known to all the participants, 
$:Pu{X} + GF(q)‘, 
where X denotes an undetermined participant not in B such that the following 
property is satisfied 
(1) the row vector $(X) can be expressed as a linear combination of the row vectors 
in the set {@(Pi): Pi E A} if and only if A is an authorized subset of the access 
structure r. 
To construct a democratic secret sharing scheme realizing r the participants in 
9 proceed as follows. 
(i) Each participant Pj in 9 chooses uniformly at random an element aj in GF(q). 
The secret is 
n 
S= 1 aj. 
j=l 
(ii) Each participant Pi in 9 chooses uniformly at random a row vector vi in GF(q) 
such that Ui = Vi.~(X), where “.” IS the inner product in GF(q)‘. Then, Pi gives the 
element Si. j = Vi. l//(Pj) t0 participant Pj, forj = 1, . . . , n. Indeed, each participant Pj is 
able to calculate his own share as 
” 
Sj = 1 Si,j. 
i=l 
The properties of the described construction are summarized in the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 1. Any subset of participants A E r can calculate the secret s, but no subset of 
participants A’$T can determine any partial information regarding s. 
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Proof. Since property (1) holds, for each authorized subset of participants A E r it 
results 
where the elements cI are known to all the participants in 9. For each Pi in 9 we have 
Ui = Vi ’ Ii/(X) 
= vi’,:,C,A clti(pl) 
I 
= ,:;A 
clvi. $(Pr) (by linearity of “s “) 
I 
= ,:,C., cIsi.I. 
I 
Let US sum ai over i = 1, . . . , n, to get 
Zi=iai=i 1 cl%, I 
i=l i=l I:P,sA 
= ,:zA i$l clSi.1 (by commutativity) 
= ,:zA CI i$l si,l (by linearity) 
= ,:,c., CA. 
I 
Consequently, the participants in A can calculate the secret s as a linear combination 
of their own shares. Let A’ be a nonauthorized subset of participants. For all Pj in A’, 
we have 
Sj zz i Si,j = i Vi’ Il/tpi) 
i=l i=l 
= i$I $(Pj).vi (by symmetry of “.“) 
n 
= $(Pj). 2 vi (by linearity of “.“) 
i=l 
= rl/(Pj)' C Vi + $(pj)' C Vi, 
i:PteA’ i:PisP-A’ 
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Likewise, 
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S= i ai=+( C Vi + $(X)' C Vi. 
i=l i:PieA’ i:Pis.Y-A’ 
Denote 
VA, = i:zA, “i and VST-A, = 1 Vi, 
i:PisB-A’ 
where v,~_~, is a row vector in GF(q)’ unknown to all the participants in A’. The best 
that the participants in A’ can do to determine any information regarding the secret 
s is to consider the system of equations 
$(pj)'v.$-A, = sj - $(Pj)'vA', 
for all Pj in A’, and 
$(x)‘v9_,, = s - $(x)‘v,,. 
Let d be the dimension of the subspace generated by the vectors II/( for all Pj in A’. 
Since property (1) holds, it results in d < t and, independently from the value of the 
secret s, both the coefficient matrix and the augmented matrix of the system of 
equations have rank d + 1. Therefore, for each possible secret s there are qtmd-l 
possible solutions for VP-A’ and no information about s can be computed by the 
participants in A’. 0 
Remark. As a simple consequence of Lemma 1 the participants in B can construct 
a (k, n) threshold democratic scheme, where k < n, as follows. The participants choose 
the elements aj and the secret s is defined in GF(q), where q > n, as in (i). 
Let ozl, . . . ,cln be distinct, nonnull elements in GF(q) known to all the participants. 
Each participant Pi in B chooses uniformly at random the elements ai, 1, . . . , ai,k _ 1 
in GF(q). If qi(X) is the polynomial ai + ai.1~ + ... + ai,k-1~~-~, then Pi gives 
the element si,j = qi(aj) to participant Pj, for j = 1, . . . ,n. Indeed, each participant 
Pj is able to calculate his own share sj as in (ii). Let q(x) be the sum of poly- 
nomials qi(X)p for i = 1, . . . , n, over GF(q). The secret s of the scheme is the constant 
term of the polynomial q(x) that any k participants can calculate by interpolation 
[ll, 143. 
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